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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the parish of defendant's domicile has jurisdiction over divorce
and separation suits. 4 Therefore, in cases involving exclusively
intrastate or inter-parish elements, the only necessity for deter-
mining the domicile of either party is to determine the parish in
which the suit must be filed.
In determining the domicile of the wife, the supreme court
consistently has applied Article 39 of the Civil Code,5 which
states that the wife has no domicile other than that of her hus-
band. Though by way of dictum often mentioning the possibility
of a contrary conclusion,6 the supreme court invariably has re-
fused to allow a wife to establish a separate domicile in cases
involving intrastate or inter-parish jurisdictional questions7
Indeed, if the wife were allowed to establish a separate domicile
because of the husband's cruel treatment, it would be necessary
to decide the merits of the case in order to determine in which
parish the suit should be brought. Because of the necessity of in-
suring full faith and credit in interstate cases, however, the court
has allowed a wife to establish a domicile in this state when her
husband was domiciled in another.8 But these decisions and the
reasons underlying them should never be confused with those
cases involving only intrastate or inter-parish jurisdictional
issues.
THOMAS A. HARRELL
LABOR LAW-VALIDITY OF STATE LAWS BANNING THE UNION
SECURITY CONTRACT-A North Carolina statute' and a Nebraska
constitutional amendment 2 providing that no person be denied an
opportunity to obtain employment because he is or is not a mem-
ber of a labor organization and forbidding employers from enter-
ing into contracts or agreements obligating themselves to exclude
4. Art. 162, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. Art. 39, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A married woman has no other domi-
cile than that of her husband."
6. Laiche v. His Wife, 156 La. 165, 100 So. 292 (1924); McGee v. Gasery,
185 La. 839, 171 So. 49 (1936); Bruno v Mauro, 205 La. 209, 17 So.(2d) 253
(1944).
7. Evans v. Saul & His Wife, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 247 (La. 1829); Glaude v.
Peat, 43 La. Ann. 161, 8 So. 884 (1891); Laiche v. His Wife, 156 La. 165, 100
So. 292 (1924); Switzer v. Elmer, 172 La. 850, 135 So. 608 (1931); McGee v.
Gasery, 185 La. 839, 171 So. 49 (1936).
8. Champon v. Champon, 40 La. Ann. 28, 3 So. 397 (1888); Smith v. Smith,
43 La. Ann. 1140, 10 So. 248 (1891); George v. George, 143 La. 1032, 79 So.
832 (1918); Zinko v. Zinko, 204 La. 478, 15 So.(2d) 859 (1943); Burgan v. Bur-
gan, 207 La. 1057, 22 So.(2d) 649 (1945).
1. N.C. Laws (1947) c. 328, § 2.
2. Neb. Const. Art. XV, § 13, as adopted in 1946.
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persons from employment because they are or are not labor union
members are valid under the United States Constitution. Lin-
coln Federal Labor Union No. 19129, American Federation of
Labor v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Company; Whitaker v. State
of North Carolina, 69 S.Ct. 251 (U.S. 1949).
In rejecting the allegations of unconstitutionality, the Court
held that these laws do not abridge freedom of speech and oppor-
tunity of union members peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for a redress of grievances,3 for nothing in the lan-
guage of the laws indicates a purpose to prohibit speech, assem-
bly, or petition; the constitutional right of workers to assemble
cannot be construed as a constitutional guarantee that none shall
get and hold jobs except those who join in the assembly; the laws
do not deny equal protection of the law to unions against em-
ployers and non-union workers, 4 for they also prohibit employer-
company union contracts which obligate the employer to refuse
jobs to union members 5 and forbid employers to discriminate
against union as well as non-union members; nor do they deprive
anyone of liberty of contract without due process of law by mak-
ing it unlawful to refuse employment to a person because he is
or is not a union member;6 since the states have constitutional
power to ban such discriminations by law, they also have the
power to ban contracts which if performed would bring about
the prohibited discrimination.
Notwithstanding the limited recognition given to union se-
curity contracts by the Taft-Hartley Law,7 it reserves to the
states power to prohibit any such contract. The reservation
reads: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as author-
izing the execution or application of agreements requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in
any State or Territory in which such execution or application is
prohibited by State or Territorial law." The state action con-
sidered in the instant case was, of course, protected by this provi-
3. U.S. Const. Amends. I, XIV.
4. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
5. The so-called "yellow-dog" contract is non-enforceable in any court
of the United States. See 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 103 (1932).
6. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
7. The Taft-Hartley Law authorizes the union-shop contract, which
allows the hiring of non-union workers but requires they join the union
within thirty days after entering employment. See 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. 1948).
8. 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(b) (Supp. 1948).
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sion against any charge that it was in conflict with the Taft-
Hartley LawY
In view of the proposals now before Congress, to repeal or
amend the Taft-Hartley Law, 10 the validity of state action of
this character will doubtless Come again before the court for
determination, unprotected by the saving language of the present
law. Since a total of twenty-two states have enacted laws against
the making of union-security agreements," the question of the
validity of this legislation continues to be of major importance.
Its status under the Wagner Act' 2 may be the issue, if the view
,of those who are advocating return to this earlier law should pre-
vail.
The Wagner Act does not contain any language giving states
power to ban union security agreements. On the other hand,
Section 8 (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer,
"By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That
nothing in this Act . .. or in any other statute of the United
States shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employ-
ment membership therein. . . ."1 In addition, Section 7 declares
that "Employees shall have the right . . .to engage in . . . con-
certed activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, '4 and Section 13 adds, "Nothing in ...
9. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.
C.A. § 141 (Supp. 1948).
10. Bills to amend: II.R. 209, 439. Bills to repeal: S. 69, 249; H.R. 211,
231, 237, 259, 482, 891, 985, 1143, 1184, 1219, 1318.
11. Laws banning any and all forms of union security agreements have
been enacted in twelve states: Arizona constitutional amendment, Ariz.
Laws (1947) 399; Arkansas constitutional amendment No. 34, Nov. 7, 1944
and Ark. Act 101 of 1947; Ga. Laws 1947, No. 140, p. 616; Iowa Laws (1947)
c. 296; Neb. Const. Art. XV, § 13, as adopted in 1946; Nev. Comp. Laws (1929)
§ 10473; N.C. Laws (1947) c. 328, § 2; N.D. Laws (1947) c. 92; S.D. Const. Art.
6, § 2, as amended Nov. 1, 1946, and S.D. Laws (1947) c. 92; Tenn. Pub. Acts
(1947) c. 36; Texas Laws (1947) c. 74; Va. Acts of Assembly (1947) c. 2.
Various other states have declared the union-security contract to be
against public policy but have provided no penalties for operation under such
contracts. Louisiana is among these: La. Act 202 of 1934, § 2 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §4381.2]. Cf. Uniform Control Act, La. Act 180 of 1946, §§ 1-8 [Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1947) §§ 4379.18-4379.25]. Others permit union-security contracts
only under specified conditions.
For a survey of state laws on the subject, see 21 Labor Relations Ref-
erence Manual 66 (1947-1948).
12. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151
(1935).
13. 49 Stat. 452, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(3) (1935).
14. 49 Stat. 452, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1935).
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this title shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike."' 5
In the opinion under consideration the Court said that "states
have the power to legislate against what are found to be injurious
practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so
long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal con-
stitutional prohibition or some valid federal law.' 6 ,The broad
question would therefore be whether a state law banning union
security contracts would run afoul of the foregoing provisions of
the Wagner Act.
Although Section 8(3) provides that nothing in any other
statute of the United States shall preclude an employer from
entering into a closed shop contract, it says nothing about state
statutes.1 7 The obvious purpose of this section is to protect an
employer from committing an unfair labor practice in violation
of the act by entering into a closed shop contract with the union
which holds bargaining rights for his employees. This purpose
and the language of Section 8(3) afford no basis for finding an
implied ban against state enactments outlawing the union se-
curity contract. The Supreme Court has observed that, in the
Wagner Act, "Congress has not seen fit to lay down even the
most general guides to construction of the Act, as it sometimes
does, by saying that its regulation either shall or shall not exclude
state action.' 8s
The Court has likewise expressed its opinion concerning the
meaning of Section 13. In International Union, U.A.W., A.F.- of
15. 49 Stat. 457, 29 U.S.C.A. § 163 (1935).
16. 60 S.Ct. 251, 257 (U.S. 1949).
17. See International Union, U.A.W., A.F. of L. 232 v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, 69 S.Ct. 516, 521 (U.S. 1949): "Congress designedly left
open an area for state control . . . the intention of Congress to exclude states
from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested." Allen-Bradley
Local No. 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315.U.S. 740, 749, 62 S.Ct. 820, 825,
86 L.Ed. 1154, 1164 (1942): ". . . this Court has long insisted that an inten-
tion of Congress to exclude states from exerting their police power must be
clearly manifested." But see Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor
Relations Board; Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation v. Kelly, 330 U.S. 767,
772, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 1029, 91 L.Ed. 1234, 1245 (1947): "It has long been a rule
that exclusion of state action may be implied from the nature of the legis-
lation and the nature of the subject matter although express declaration of
such result is wanting."
18. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board; Alle-
gheny Ludlum Steel Corporation v. Kelly, 330 U.S. 767, 771, 67 S.Ct. 1026,
1029, 91 L.Ed. 1234, 1244, 1245 (1947). See International Union, U.A.W. A.F.
of L. 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 69 S.Ct. 516, 521 (U.S.
1949): "Congress has not seen fit in any of these Acts to declare a general
policy or to state specific rules as to their effects on state regulations over
which the several states traditionally have exercised control."
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L. 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,19 decided in
February, 1949, it said, "What other acts or state laws might do
is not attempted to be regulated by this section."
The most serious question concerns Section 7. In the Inter-
national Union case, the Supreme Court dealt with the effect of
Section 7 on a state labor board injunction enjoining a series of
unannounced union meetings, held during working hours and
designed to spur the employer into a contract favorable to the
union. The state board order was issued while the Wagner Act
was still in effect. The Court decided that nothing in the act
specifically excluded the power of the state to enjoin such action
and that Congress had expressed no policy on the activity. To
the argument that Section 7 grants employees the right to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, the Court replied that the bare
language of the section "cannot be construed to immunize the
conduct forbidden by the judgment below." And it added, "No
longer can any state, as to relations within reach of the Act, treat
otherwise lawful activities to aid unionization as an illegal con-
spiracy merely because they are undertaken by many persons
acting in concert. But because legal conduct may not be made
illegal by concert, it does not mean that otherwise illegal action
is made legal by concert. ' 20 In other words, the purpose of
Section 7 was to preclude any state finding, in concerted activi-
ties in aid of collective bargaining or unionization, an illegal con-
spiracy in consequence of the fact that the action was in concert;
it did not undertake to provide that a state might not continue
to deal with otherwise illegal action. The Court was influenced
by prior jurisprudence recognizing that the Wagner Act did not
give protection to all kinds and types of work stoppages, and
that, in general, the kind of concerted activity protected thereby
was that which, not considering the element of concert, would
be recognized as not unlawful. In short, harrassment of an em-
ployer by repeatedly calling unannounced work stoppages was
not concerted activity of the kind protected by the act.
Prior to modern legislation, strikes to secure a closed shop
were considered lawful in some jurisdictions and unlawful in
others, with perhaps the latter being in the majority. Even
though a strike for a closed shop might be given the protection of
Section 7 as a concerted activity not otherwise illegal, the ques-
19. 69 S.Ct. 516, 526 (U.S. 1949).
20. 69 S.Ct. 516, 523.
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tion remains as to what effect such a view would have with re-
spect to the validity of state enactments making it unlawful for
an employer to enter into a closed shop contract with a union
and thereby discriminating against non-member workers. Mr.
Justice Rutledge, in his concurring opinion in the American Sash
and Door case2 pointed up the problem. On the one hand we
would have the state saying it is illegal for an employer to make
a closed shop contract with a union and, on the other, the federal
government saying that it is legal for a union to strike to secure
a closed shop. There seems to be an extensive, although ques-
tionable, belief at large in the states to the effect that strikes for
objects found illegal under state law, and picketing in support
thereof, may be enjoined. States having legislation of the type
being considered might therefore believe that they would have
the power to enjoin a strike aimed at inducing an employer to
enter into a closed shop contract on the ground that the object
sought could not be legally granted by the employer.2 2 Under
the stated assumption concerning the coverage of Section 7, such
a view would not be justified. But on the other hand, a contrary
view would result in putting the employer in a most unenviable
position: if he did not grant the union demand, the strike and
its concomitants might destroy his business, and if he did, he
would be in violation of state law and subject to the penalties
provided, probably including injunctive restraint.
If this issue is ever presented, the choice is going to lie be-
tween recognizing that where a state is not denied power to
forbid an employer to take any given action, it has authority to
declare illegal, and subject to appropriate sanction, any con-
certed activity seeking to compel such action, or declaring that
where concerted activity on the part of a union is protected by
federal law, the state may not forbid an employer to yield to
the demands being supported by the protected activity. The lat-
ter view would constitute a determination that a state law for-
bidding an employer to grant any demand of a union, where the
21. American Federation of Labor, Arizona State Federation of Labor v.
American Sash & Door Company; Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129,
American Federation of Labor v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.; Whitaker
v. State of North Carolina, 69 S.Ct. 260, 267 (U.S. 1949).
22. Mr. Justice Rutledge said, "The syllogism might well be: The deci-
sions in the present cases permit a state to make 'illegal' any discrimination
against non-union workers on account of that status in relation to securing
or retaining employment; strikes for 'illegal objects' are 'unlawful'; 'unlaw-
ful' strikes may be enjoined; a strike by union members against working
with non-union employees is a strike for an 'illegal object'; therefore such a
strike may be enjoined." (69 S.Ct. 260, 268.)
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union underfederal law may lawfully engage in concerted activ-
ity in support of the demand, would be inconsistent with the
federal law, and consequently invalid.
Perhaps the better way out lies in a proposal such as that
sponsored by Senator Thomas of Utah.23 He would amend Section
8 (3), among others, to read, "Provided, That nothing in this Act,
or in any state law, shall preclude an employer engaged in com-
merce or whose activities affect commerce, from making an agree-
ment with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of
employment membership therein . . . ." (Italics supplied.) This,
at least, would have the merit of freeing an employer from a
dilemma that might seriously threaten his undoing.
ROBERT B. SHAW
LIBEL AND SLANDER-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-SINGLE PUBLI-
CATION RULE-Defendant publisher commenced distribution of
the final printing of "Total Espionage," an allegedly libelous book,
in March 1944, and released copies from stock in the year imme-
diately preceding July 2, 1946, the date of suit. Held, that the
publication of a single printing of a libelous book affords only
one cause of action, which arises when the first copy is released
by the publisher for sale in accord with trade practice, and that
subsequent sales from stock do not give rise to new causes of
action, although they may be considered in assessing damages.
Hence, the action was barred by a one-year statute of limitations.'
The court thus extended the "single publication" rule, 2 adopted
for magazines and newspapers, to books. Gregoire v. G. P. Put-
nam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E. (2d) 45 (1948).
Several policy considerations have led a number of juris-
dictions3 to adopt the "single publication" rule and to abandon
the common law rule which holds that each time a libel is
brought to the attention of a third person a new publication
occurs4 and that each publication is a new cause of action. 5 These
23. This bill is a substitute for the original S. 249, introduced by Senator
Thomas. The original bill did not have the proviso excluding state laws.
1. Thompson's Laws of New York (1939) C.P.A. § 51(3).
2. McGlue v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 744 (D.C. Mass. 1946);
Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193, 37 A. L. R.
898 (1921); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N.E.(2d) 708 (1948);
Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1907); Wolfson v.
Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 640, 254 App. Div. 211, affirmed 279
N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.(2d).676 (1939).
3. See note 2, supra.
4. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849);
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